The Munich Security Conference, held in February 2016, served as a turning point, confirming a transformation in the nature of the European defense conversation. The global context, marked by the fourth year of the war in Ukraine, the intensification of great power rivalry, and the increasing instrumentalization of the economy, tariffs, and technology as new levers of power, has led to a convergence of diagnoses among policymakers, defense officials, and industry leaders. The conclusion is inescapable: the European continent must assume a much more proactive role and responsibility in managing its own security.
In this scenario of strategic redefinition, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, articulated one of the most forceful messages of the meeting, elevating mutual defense within the Union to the status of an imperative. Her assertion that mutual defense “is not optional, but an obligation” crystallizes the political and industrial acceleration that is reshaping the concept of strategic autonomy at the EU level. The discussion has shifted from a mere concern about the volume of military spending to its practical and tangible translation into the continent’s industrial and technological capacity.
This change in focus, which has been gradually consolidating, was firmly institutionalized in 2024 with the presentation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP). These instruments are specifically designed to achieve several interconnected objectives: strengthening the European defense technology and industrial base (EDTIB), fostering and significantly increasing joint procurement among Member States, and, crucially, reducing external dependencies in critical areas. The EDIS sets concrete and ambitious targets for 2030, geared towards industrial sovereignty: that at least 50% of defense procurement be carried out within the Union and that intra-EU trade represent 35% of the EU defense market. The underlying objective is clear: to achieve faster production capacity, at a larger scale, and with less dependence on third-party actors. These programs are complemented by the European Defence Fund (EDF), endowed with approximately €8 billion in the current multiannual financial framework until 2027, whose purpose is to finance the development of critical technologies, covering the entire cycle from fundamental research to operational and military application.
Spending more is no longer enough
Spending more is no longer enough; the key lies in industrial capacity. In this new perspective, European security is fundamentally structured around industrial and technological factors.
According to data from the European Defence Agency (EDA), Member States’ defence spending reached €343 billion in 2024, with forecasts of an increase to €381 billion in 2025, representing around 2.1% of the Union’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While this increased spending meets allied expectations, the real challenge and the qualitative leap lies in the ability to transform this financial effort into a self-sustaining, modern, and scalable industrial capacity.
Contemporary military power is built on a sophisticated technological foundation encompassing advanced sensors, secure communications systems, robust space capabilities, electronic warfare, unmanned platforms (drones), and artificial intelligence. All these capabilities ultimately depend on access to increasingly complex and cutting-edge semiconductors and photonics technologies. Aware of this strategic dependence, the 2023 European Chips Act set the target for the Union to achieve 20% of global semiconductor production by 2030.
However, this share currently remains below 10%, and more than 75% of advanced chip manufacturing capacity is concentrated in Asia, primarily in Taiwan and South Korea. The revision of the Chips Act that the Commission plans to present later this year, 2026, should therefore not be limited to simply attracting individual projects (such as investment from large manufacturers), but should instead pivot towards strengthening advanced manufacturing, strategic value chain integration, and, fundamentally, aggregating demand at the European level for these defense-critical technologies.
Technological dependency due to the inability to industrialize
Although Europe maintains an undisputed leadership in research across numerous technological fields, the successful transition from the laboratory to industrial scale remains uneven and constitutes
A significant “industrialization gap” exists, varying enormously depending on the specific technology and value chain. This gap between cutting-edge research and mass production capacity represents one of the main limitations and vulnerabilities to European strategic autonomy. In this context, defense policy and industrial policy have ceased to be separate spheres, merging into a single axis of national and community security.
This new approach is not limited to Brussels. In Spain, public administrations, at both the national and regional levels, are identifying and developing significant opportunities in dual-use technologies such as compound semiconductors and integrated photonics. The challenge now is to provide these initiatives with stable financial instruments and, crucially, long-term demand predictability that allows industry to invest with confidence.
Given this scenario, the protection of strategic sectors cannot be limited to regulatory mechanisms or simply controlling foreign investment (such as screening mechanisms). An active industrial strengthening policy is required, where critical technologies, such as semiconductors and photonics, are understood as true security assets. It is not simply a matter of protecting specific companies, but of guaranteeing production capacity in essential enabling technologies for defense. In this respect, open-access foundries (semiconductor manufacturing facilities) allow for the seamless connection of research, design, and production, facilitating the rapid scaling up of innovative solutions within Europe. Without access to these advanced production capabilities, EU-funded innovation risks becoming dependent on third countries for its industrialization and military deployment.
The European bureaucracy gets moving
For its part, the European Parliament, in a move often perceived as glacially slow, adopted two crucial legislative proposals on March 11, 2026, with the stated objective of “building a true EU single market for defense and closing critical gaps in the EU’s defense capabilities”. These proposals were approved by a large majority in two reports.
The first report, entitled “Report on tackling obstacles to the single defense market,” outlines MEPs’ vision for a stronger, deeper, and more integrated EU single defense market, with the dual purpose of building credible deterrence and strengthening the aforementioned European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB).
This report was adopted with 393 votes in favor, 169 against, and 67 abstentions, reflecting broad consensus. The initiative calls for increased EU funding and, in the long term, promotes “common procurement and lifecycle management, simplified regulations, and incentives for cross-border integration to reduce dependence on non-EU suppliers”.
The report argues that market integration will result in more efficient and cost-effective use of defense spending, greater competitiveness for European industry, and enhanced strategic sovereignty and resilience for the Union. To break down existing barriers, MEPs propose a “buy European” approach to defense procurement policies, seeking to strengthen the EU’s defense procurement framework (EDTIB), make demand predictable for industry, boost investment in research and development (R&D), and ultimately increase production.
A key point of the report is the recommendation that Ukraine be treated as an integral part of the EU defense market. It also underscores the urgent need to reform defense procurement rules, improve the implementation of existing directives, and simplify transfers of defense products within the EU by harmonizing licensing, certification, and mutual recognition of security authorizations. The text, however, also emphasizes the need to safeguard fair competition and avoid excessive national subsidies that could fragment the single market, particularly harming small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and smaller Member States.
Critical gaps in missile defense, ammunition, and drones
The second report adopted by the European Parliament, approved with 448 votes in favor, 122 against, and 38 abstentions, focuses on identifying the serious and persistent capability gaps facing EU Member States, addressing the need to promote “flagship European defense projects of common interest.”
The report identifies critical and specific gaps in:
- Air and anti missile defense (a key lesson from the war in Ukraine).
- Artillery, missiles, and munitions.
- Drones and counter-drone systems.
- Strategic enablers (including space and critical infrastructure).
- Military mobility.
- Cyber.
- Artificial intelligence and electronic warfare.
- Land and maritime combat.
These gaps, according to MEPs, not only represent an abstract risk but also significantly weaken the EU’s ability to deter threats and, in the event of conflict, to sustain prolonged, large-scale military operations, in a context of increasing risks of hybrid and conventional warfare. The solution lies in addressing these critical deficiencies through greater European cooperation on strategic and industrial issues, coordinated needs planning, and targeted investment to ensure defensive readiness. The report, however, also acknowledges and values the efforts already being made by stakeholders within the European defense technology and industrial base.
From concept to effective capability
In this new world order dominated by major powers, a single European defense market is not an ambitious ideal: it is an urgent necessity. Only by fully exploiting the potential of the single market can we create a defense system in which every euro invested provides maximum innovation, security, and cost-effectiveness. Europe’s autonomy begins with a single defense market.
In this landscape of urgency and redefinition, innovative technological initiatives must be interpreted not simply as niche industrial projects, but as fundamental strategic capabilities for European technological sovereignty.
The maxim of “making in Europe what Europe needs to defend itself” has ceased to be a desirable industrial policy option and has become an indispensable condition. It is the key for strategic autonomy to transcend the theoretical realm and become a real, effective, and credible defense capability in the face of the challenges of the new geopolitical era.
